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Abstract: This chapter introduces the difficulty of acquiring phenomenological terms by 
examining Carnap’s and Derrida’s criticisms of phenomenological speech; their criticisms show 
that any account of how phenomenological speech is acquired must clarify its distinction from 
ordinary speech about things while not falling prey to an esoteric separation. The chapter then 
reviews the way Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger offer “indication” as the way to distinguish but 
not separate the one and the other, and it argues that indication, even with the support of analogy, 
metaphor, and metonym, suffers from Quinean indeterminacy and therefore requires some other 
resources for its successful enactment. Finally, the chapter outlines a novel solution to the 
problem of phenomenological speech by approaching the question as one of genesis and 
acquisition: ordinary language embeds certain experiential terms, such as “presence” and 
“absence,” that, when inflected, introduce the learner into the transcendental dimension of 
experience. The chapter demonstrates that the question of language learning or acquisition is 
necessary for unraveling the nature of phenomenological language and clarifying its relation to 
ordinary speech.  
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“Not comprehending, they hear like 
the deaf. The saying is their witness: 
absent while present.” 
—Heraclitus
1
 
 
We learn our mother tongue by attending to our caregivers in the context of everyday routines. 
We eavesdrop on their conversations and make sense of their foreign word-sounds thanks to the 
familiar meanings inscribed in the movements of their animate bodies as they tend toward things 
of interest and away from things of disinterest or of evident aversion. In the milieu of everyday 
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speech ordinarily acquired, we encounter philosophical terminology only as something strange or 
foreign. At first, we pick up these terms as jargon, as words we might employ but only clumsily 
and with great confusion. But in time we can go beyond mere use to actual understanding. Here 
these foreign words become familiar; instead of sounds said according to certain social routines 
or ways of speaking, they become words weighted with the truth of meaning. Now what is the 
relation between our mother tongue and our philosophical one? Quite obviously philosophizing 
requires everyday language as its background. How can the philosophical logos appear within 
everyday speech as other than it, so that it may be acquired as what it is?  
 The problem of philosophical speech is an old one. Plato, for example, maintained that 
though language cannot express philosophical insight, it nonetheless helps occasion it; 
philosophy “is not something that can be put into words like other sciences; but after long-
continued intercourse between teacher and pupil, in joint pursuit of the subject, suddenly, like 
light flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it is born in the soul and straightway nourishes itself” 
(341c). When it comes to phenomenology the question of philosophical logos becomes more 
vexed, for phenomenology trades on a shift in interest from things to the presence of those 
things, and the shift in experience requires a corresponding shift in language. Hence the question 
concerning the genesis of phenomenological language seems to be: how can a language fitted to 
things be repurposed to talk about the presence of those things? I think it necessary to challenge 
the framing of this question, for in fact ordinary language comprises both thing-directed and 
experience-directed terms, both ontic and transcendental terms. Therefore, the question is not 
how to bridge ordinary and phenomenological speech—both are possibilities of one’s mother 
tongue—but how to activate possibilities for phenomenological exploration, possibilities 
inscribed into the very texture of ordinary speech. In this paper, I argue that such activation 
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occurs through a process I name “inflection.” This term of enactment recalls two senses of the 
root word, “flexion.” 
First, flexion names the native part–whole structure of experienced things that becomes 
expressed by the attributive or predicative function of the verb, “to be.” In the Sixth 
Investigation, Husserl argues that “the form-giving flexion being” (die formgebende Flexion, das 
Sein) does not arise through reflection even though it is not to be found in a straightforward 
perception of things: one sees paper and whiteness but not that the paper is white; one hears a 
creak but not that the door is creaking. The flexion expressed by being arises instead through a 
widened sense of perception called categorial intuition (Husserl 2001b, 277–81). Second, the 
root of inflection, flexion, also recalls the animate body—Merleau-Ponty’s “flesh” (chair)—that 
enables presence to oneself and joint presence with others, a theme with anticipations in 
Augustine and parallels in Wittgenstein (Engelland 2014). One flexes one’s joints in order to 
move toward and away from things or bring things close for inspection. In doing so, one 
advertises to others, whether with a communicative intention or not, which object is engaging 
one’s attention. The parent who walks over and picks up the ball makes her ball-directed interest 
manifest simply in virtue of picking it up. Infants start to learn speech only after figuring out the 
meaning latent in this sort of disclosive movement. Such movement has to become emphasized, 
has to be sorted or understood in a new way to enable prelinguistic joint presence.  
These two senses of flexion are entwined. Flexion suggests bending, especially limbs and 
joints. The natural jointure of the moving body mirrors the part–whole structure of perceived 
objects; just as we articulate our bodies, so we can, in speech, articulate things; speech in this 
way appears analogous to bodily grasping or gathering. Flexion also names the grammatical 
inflection of terms, and these terms function as they do so that the various words that comprise a 
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sentence fit together with the unity of a single, articulated body. To speak about things is to 
articulate their experienced flexion or tissue of relations at work in them.  
Against this background, I argue that inflection names two processes of appropriation. (1) 
It names the way phenomenological terms arise through a process of appropriating the 
transcendental possibilities of our mother tongue. That is, initiates come to acquire 
phenomenological terms only once they have become clued in to the natural disclosive character 
of ordinary speech. (2) It also names the initiation of the means for appropriating our mother 
tongue in the first place. That is, infants come to learn their first words only once they have 
become clued in to the natural revelatory character of bodily movement. That primal, natural 
means of communication must itself be inflected just to get speech off the ground. The inflection 
that opens phenomenological word learning echoes the inflection that opens first word learning.  
Words such as “experience” and “presence,” as with the term “being,” are not acquired 
through reflection or straightforward perception of things but instead belong to the natural 
transcendental vocabulary of experience. To inflect is to make explicit the implicit work of the 
flexion of experience, which highlights the interconnected and dynamic structure of the domain 
of experience: inflection alters the syntax but not the semantics of its terms by bringing out the 
latent transcendental resources of speech. Instead of a syntax geared toward things and their 
properties, inflection delivers a syntax geared toward the experiential domain. Inflection thereby 
appropriates what we might regard as the natural transcendental vocabulary of the vernacular.  
To motivate my account of inflection, I introduce the difficulty of acquiring 
phenomenological terms by examining two high-profile criticisms of phenomenological speech 
in the figures of Carnap and Derrida, and I conclude that any account of how phenomenological 
speech is acquired must clarify its distinction from ordinary speech about things while not falling 
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prey to an esoteric separation. Second, I review the way Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger offer 
“indication” as the way to distinguish but not separate the one and the other. Third, I point out 
that indication on its own suffers from Quinean indeterminacy and therefore requires some other 
resources for its successful enactment; I argue that the usual candidates for aiding indication—
analogy, metaphor, and metonym—are insufficient for resolving this indeterminacy. Finally, I 
provide my own solution to the problem of philosophical speech, which approaches the question 
as one of genesis and acquisition: ordinary language embeds certain experiential terms that, 
when inflected, introduce the learner into the transcendental dimension of experience. I have in 
mind such terms as “presence,” “absence,” and even the word “interesting.”
2
 Inflection is the 
process of discovering that these terms express the experiential horizon of the speaker. My 
contribution, then, is to demonstrate the relevance of the question of language learning or 
acquisition for illuminating the nature of phenomenological language and its relation to ordinary 
speech.  
 My goal is not only to handle the indeterminacy of indication but also to show that 
phenomenology’s reputation for obscurity is without foundation: phenomenological speech has 
its natural roots in our mother tongue (cf. Ricoeur 2014, 41), and its acquisition engenders no 
more vexing problems than the advent of our first language. In this way, I develop Ricoeur’s 
fecund suggestion: “If phenomenological reduction is to be something other than the suspension 
of our links to the world, it must be the ‘beginning’ of a life of meaning, the simultaneous ‘birth’ 
of the spoken-being of the world and the speaking-being of man” (Ricoeur, 1967, 30). We can 
speak phenomenologically about experience because we can already speak ordinarily about the 
presence and absence of things that show up in the world around us.  
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1. THE PROBLEM OF ACQUIRING PHENOMENOLOGICAL SPEECH 
How does one enter into phenomenology? The difficulty might seem akin to acquiring any 
technical vocabulary or perhaps akin to acquiring a second language. But I would like to suggest 
that the problem is equivalent to learning one’s native language, and I want to suggest further 
than the acquisition of phenomenological speech is a way of bringing to completion the language 
one first learns, of actuating certain possibilities resident in it. 
Phenomenology is not simply a technical vocabulary developed to conceptualize a region 
of investigation. Technical language occurs by means of a guided elucidation of examples 
offered for investigation. One acquires the language of mathematics, for example, by means of 
making sense of instances of number and counting. Here one can call upon the resources of the 
vernacular to disclose the region of things being investigated. But insofar as phenomenology 
deals with the domain of experience itself rather than types of things that show up in experience, 
it is not possible to handle its acquisition as another type of specialized discourse alongside the 
sciences and everyday technical vocabularies (talk of sports or of markets, for example).  
Acquiring phenomenology is not akin to learning a second or foreign language. While it 
is true that learning such a language challenges certain ways in which we carve up the world, it 
nonetheless proceeds through a process of translating. My own native language already shows 
me how to speak of things, and I learn a new language in light of the speaking I can already 
accomplish. Hence I am not learning to speak and understand in a radically different way; I am 
rather learning to speak and understand about the same things I would like to speak about and 
understand in my native language. Yes, I achieve a new distance to typical ways of articulating, 
becoming aware of the nuances at work in the way the languages differ in presenting things, but 
in doing so I do not accomplish a shift from things to their presentation. Hence, acquiring 
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phenomenological speech is not like acquiring a second language, because phenomenological 
speech purports to talk about something other than what ordinary speech ordinarily is thought to 
talk about. 
I am suggesting instead that phenomenological speech poses a unique problem of 
acquisition. I think the best way to understand it is as a further move, an organic development of 
the acquisition of one’s first language. The reason it is so important for phenomenology to clarify 
the problem of its acquisition, and to naturalize it along the lines I will be developing in this 
paper, is the fact that otherwise its terms can all too easily appear to be nonsensical or esoteric.  
 
1.1 Nonsensical 
Rudolf Carnap (1959) takes issue with the way in which Heidegger expresses himself in the 
notorious 1929 lecture, “What Is Metaphysics?” This is not surprising; even an astute 
phenomenologist such as Edith Stein recoils before the text’s “mythological tones” (Stein 2007, 
92) evident in such strange assertions as the following: “The nothing itself nihilates” (Heidegger 
1998, 90). Nonetheless, there is something revealing about Carnap’s criticism in terms of how 
phenomenological claims can routinely be misunderstood. He thinks all speech concerns things, 
because speech is bound by experience and experience concerns things. Heidegger, no less than 
Stein and Husserl, would accept the claim that speech is bound by experience while denying that 
experience exclusively concerns things. There is more to experience than the merely empirical; 
hence there is more to speech than what can be said by science. In this way, phenomenological 
experience involves not only new semantics but also a new syntax—“we lack not only most of 
the words but, above all, the ‘grammar’” (Heidegger 1962, 63). What is this new grammar? 
Kisiel (1995) astutely characterizes it as a temporal grammar of presencing rather than an ontic 
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grammar of objects. Heidegger himself expresses the temporal grammar in 1928, “Timeliness 
brings itself forth” (Zeitlichkeit sich zeitigt) and in 1973, “. . . presencing itself presences” 
(Heidegger 1984, 212, trans. mod.; Heidegger 2003, 80). Carnap does not realize that 
phenomenological language is distinct not only semantically but also syntactically from 
everyday discourse about things. And yet the problem remains, how does phenomenology’s 
vocabulary relate to this everyday discourse? 
 
1.2 Inaccessible 
Chief among the failings that Derrida sees in Husserl is the failure to give an account of language 
in general and phenomenological language in particular. Husserl insists on the otherness of 
philosophical investigation without recognizing that such otherness compromises the conditions 
for linguistic communication. He has no account of specifically phenomenological language but 
must implicitly assume the continuity of ordinary language or metaphysics with phenomenology 
in order to appeal to phenomenological terms as indications. Derrida writes, “The unity of 
ordinary language (or the language of traditional metaphysics) and the language of 
phenomenology is never broken in spite of the precautions, the ‘brackets,’ the renovations and 
innovations” (Derrida 1973, 8). But must the unity of language be broken? How can 
phenomenology be made accessible to initiates if it involves a rupture with ordinary language? 
Phenomenology all too easily appears to be nonsensical or inaccessible. How can it 
maintain the distinctness of its speech without having it devolve into a separation? How can 
phenomenological speech—and its novel logic of experience—be introduced in the terms of 
ordinary speech? 
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2. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: INDICATION 
Max Scheler notes an early criticism of Husserl’s Logical Investigations by Wilhelm Wundt, 
who complains that Husserl never gets around to defining his terms; instead, he says what the 
terms are not and then concludes his discussion with a tautology. Scheler remarks: 
What Wundt did not consider is nothing less than the possible sense of a 
phenomenological discussion. This sense is only: to bring the reader (or listener) to see 
that which, by its essence, can only be “seen”; it is in view of this that all the propositions 
which occur in the book, all the conclusions, all the provisional definitions which are 
introduced as they are needed, all the provisional descriptions, all the chains of argument 
and proof, have simply the function of a “pointer,” pointing to what is to be brought to 
sight. (Scheler 1973a, 172–3) 
 
Scheler, following Husserl and followed by Heidegger, regards phenomenological terms as in the 
first place indications; they “can only be pointed to [aufgewiesen]” in order “to make them seen” 
(Scheler 1973b, 50). In a phenomenological text, the reader comes across words expressed in 
ordinary language whose function is to indicate phenomenological experiences that must then be 
enacted by the reader for the sense to be made plain. 
At the start of the First Investigation, Husserl introduces a crucial distinction between 
“indications” (Anzeigen) and “expressions” (Ausdrücke) (Husserl 2001, 183). Indications include 
marks and signals. Expressions include words, sentences, and language in general. Given his 
interest in logic, Husserl sets indications aside in order to focus on expressions, both simple and 
complex. It is thus curious that phenomenologists characterize phenomenological terms as 
indications rather than straightforward expressions. They do so because of the specific character 
of phenomenological speech, namely the fact that its terms are inseparable from 
phenomenological experience. Apart from such experience, the terms are meaningless; they 
merely indicate or point in the direction of that experience. Yet with that experience, they are 
meaningful expressions. 
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In the Sixth Investigation, Husserl analyzes what he calls “essentially occasional 
expressions,” such as this or I. The indexed items might be absent to the auditor or reader. In 
such cases, the term indicates but does not express; there is no “definite reference” established 
apart from the requisite experience (Husserl 2001b, 199–200). Earlier Husserl distinguishes two 
kinds of meaning: “indicating” (anzeigende) and “indicated” (angezeigte); the former points out 
in an indeterminate way and the latter fixes the reference to something determinate. He says that 
all terms said in relation to oneself are essentially occasional (Husserl 2001a, 220). In this way, 
phenomenological terms follow the logic of the occasional. They have an implicit “this” placed 
before them that constitutes an invitation to the interlocutor to convert an indefinite to a definite 
expression by turning to see what it is that the speaker has seen and means. In Ideas I, Husserl 
calls these “intuitive pointers” (intuitiven Aufweisungen) in contrast to definitions (Husserl 2014, 
164). 
Husserl becomes increasingly concerned with the question of language. In the Crisis, he 
notes a tension between the ordinary and the phenomenological; it is not only “unavoidable” for 
phenomenology to use ordinary language, it is “unavoidable” for the meanings of these ordinary 
terms to be “transformed” (Husserl 1970, 210). How shall we construe the relation between the 
two? In Ideas III, he provides two essential directives. First, phenomenological terms are not the 
same as ordinary words brought to fulfillment but have a different meaning determined by the 
intuited essences (Husserl 1980, 48). Second, ordinary words are connected to phenomenological 
terms as indications of the direction of phenomenological experience (Husserl 1980, 48). This 
raises the question of just how it is that an ordinary word can point to an experience other than its 
own proper fulfillment. How can it be bent to indicate something, strictly speaking, equivocal? 
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Heidegger’s formal indication takes over the Husserl–Scheler thesis of indication, but it 
also draws upon Husserl’s resources of formalization to explain the problem of redirection 
(Engelland 2017, 45–54). Unlike the logic of the general that proceeds from species to genus to 
higher levels of abstraction, the phenomenological indication points to greater degrees of 
formalization as it drills down into the apriori structures of experience. Formal indication negates 
the thing-directedness of speech, and it implicates a textual web of interconnected meanings 
concerning the structure of human existence as the place of experience. Yet the tension remains: 
as expressions these terms mislead but as indications they can lead into the phenomenological 
domain: 
All statements about the being of human existence, all propositions about time, all 
propositions within the problematic of the essence of ur-temporality have, as expressed 
propositions, the character of indication [Anzeige]. But they indicate [indizieren] only 
human existence, even though, as expressed propositions, they nonetheless first refer to 
something merely-present. They indicate human existence and the structure of human 
existence and of time. They indicate the possible understanding of the structure of human 
existence, and, to the degree that it is available in such understanding, the possible 
conceptualizability of that structure. (Heidegger 2010, 339) 
 
How can a familiar expression be repurposed as a formal indication? While the 
phenomenological account of indication in Scheler, Husserl, and Heidegger preserves the 
difference between ordinary and phenomenological terms, it does so only by leaving unexplained 
just how an ordinary term might redirect us to the phenomenological domain of experience. 
When we think of a phenomenological text as not only or perhaps even in the first place a record 
of phenomenological insights but instead as a mode of writing conveying possibilities for 
philosophical analysis, a mode of speech introducing phenomenology to the uninitiated, the 
problem of language becomes heightened. Language is there not simply to remind us of insights 
but to occasion them. How can the direction of these indications be ascertained by the reader? 
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 Before attending to this question, let me consider an objection: how novel is this appeal 
to indication? After all, any unknown word—everyday or phenomenological—appears at first as 
an expression that points rather than expresses. The listener or reader is rebuffed by the new 
combination of characters or the word-sound; that is to say, she cannot find her way into the 
word and through the word to the meant thing in the way she does automatically and without 
trouble for those words she knows. The unknown word-sound elicits our attention and instigates 
a wonder: “What does ‘intercalate’ mean?” To be told, “It means to interweave, such as fingers 
interlocked,” fills in the expression’s empty meaning. The unknown word-sound intimates the 
unknown thoughts of the speaker who speaks with understanding. To learn the meaning is to 
learn those selfsame thoughts. Thereafter, the word fulfills its nature; it no longer points but 
expresses. 
Although every unknown word occurs first in conversation as a pointer, 
phenomenological terms are different in that they cannot be learned by furnishing a definition or 
by attending to linguistic context. Instead the interlocutor must first look to see what is there to 
be seen and thereby discover the meaning of the words in question. In this way, 
phenomenological indications are in fact ostensions or words whose meanings are clarified by an 
act of pointing that is brought to completion by the auditor’s looking and understanding the 
referent for herself. In place of phenomenological definitions there are only phenomenological 
exhibitions achieved by following up the promptings of phenomenological indications. 
Nonetheless, the problem remains: just how do these indications indicate? 
 
  
13 
 
   
3. INDICATION’S PROBLEM OF INDETERMINACY 
Because phenomenological terms arise through ostension they are subject to Quine’s worries 
about indeterminacy. Quine (1969) illustrates these worries by imagining a linguist in the field 
eavesdropping on the unknown speech of a native. When a rabbit hops past, the native says, 
“Gavagai.” What, Quine asks, should the linguist write down as the meaning of the word, 
‘gavagai’? Is it animal, rabbitness, hopping, moving, whiteness, furriness, or what? Quine’s 
analysis underscores an observation made earlier by Wittgenstein (1958) and much earlier by 
Augustine (1995): any act of pointing is inherently ambiguous concerning its scope, for it cannot 
specify which present thing or which level of the present thing is being pointed out (Quine 1969, 
31). The ambiguity is aggravated when it comes to making sense of phenomenological language, 
because phenomenology points to something, the field of experience, that will remain 
inconspicuous unless the person does something determinate, but this determinate action is just 
what is unknown. A reader comes across the word “Dasein.” What does it mean? Is it ego, self, 
person, existent, rational animal, homo sapiens, or what? Heidegger aims to indicate not one of 
these things but rather to designate something that can be fixed only thanks to a series of 
phenomenological analyses. In this way, phenomenological indications are cases of linguistic 
ostensions. They are indications that have the implicit conditional, if you follow my lead, you will 
see what I mean.  
Indication preserves the difference between ordinary and phenomenological terms but 
only by exacerbating worries about indeterminacy. In a somewhat different context, Daniel 
Dahlstrom calls for mediating terms to clarify the relation between the ontic and the ontological: 
“Yet the danger of confusing or collapsing the levels (ontic and ontological) is all the greater the 
more ambiguously their relations are construed or the more they are left unaddressed” 
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(Dahlstrom 2001, 452). How, then, can the relation be clarified? Commentators have made 
several suggestions for disambiguating indication, for providing a needed direction for its 
deployment: analogy, metaphor, and metonym. In my view, these are helpful but insufficient. 
 
3.1 Analogy 
Eugen Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation, written in consultation with Husserl, has the great 
merit of focusing on the question of phenomenological language. However, rather than framing 
the problem of such language in a fruitful way, the text makes it insoluble. As Steven Crowell 
remarks, Fink gives us a “gnostic” phenomenology that represents the phenomenological 
reduction after the fashion of Hegel as a kind of inverted world (Crowell 2001, 246). Fink, 
starkly contrasting the everyday and the phenomenological, attempts to bridge them in terms of a 
doubled analogy. Ordinarily, we speak of existent things in the world. Phenomenologically, we 
speak instead about what transcends the world. To speak phenomenologically, then, we have to 
help ourselves to a unique analogy: not the analogy of two things in the world, but an analogy of 
one thing in the world to the transcendental consciousness outside of the world: 
If, now, natural language, which is exhibited by the phenomenological epoche as a 
dispositional habituality of the constituting I, is claimed by the phenomenologizing 
onlooker for the explication of his “theoretical experience”—which does not deal with 
what is “existent” (with that which is end-constituted), but with that constituting life 
which actualizes itself and the world in stages of “pre-being”—then the natural meanings 
of words and sentences cannot stand in a relationship of analogical predication to the 
intended transcendental sense-elements. This is because ontic meanings just cannot form 
an analogy to “non-ontic” transcendental meanings, for the two cannot be at all 
compared with one another. . . . The “transcendental analogy of signifying” which 
governs the whole of phenomenological predicative explication is thus not an analogy 
possible within natural speech, but an analogy to the analogy that is found within natural 
speech; and it is the phenomenological reduction that makes that possible. (Fink 1995, 
90–1)  
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For Fink, then, the phenomenological logos emerges by means of a doubled analogy that exceeds 
natural speech. In my view, Fink rightly underscores the limits of ontic relations for exhibiting 
phenomenological ones, but he fails to appreciate the amplitude of natural speech, which 
includes not only the ontic but also the transcendental, and that failure presents an 
insurmountable obstacle to the acquisition of phenomenological speech. It is indeed a gnostic 
path. 
 
3.2 Metaphor and Metonym 
Sokolowski handles the problem of phenomenological speech by underscoring the way in which 
ordinary language and experience ever remain on the verge of phenomenological experience and 
speech. He points out that talk about such topics as “truth” and “presence” are “scraps of 
transcendentalese in the vernacular” (Sokolowski 1974, 254). Attempts to make sense of them 
without entering into phenomenology result in hopeless confusion. “But failure to make the 
transcendental turn prevents one from speaking coherently about truth and presencing, because 
objects will always be intruding where the presence of objects should be discussed” (Sokolowski 
1974, 254). He also suggests that some phenomenological terms arise at first as metaphors and 
they retain a residue of their pre-metaphorical or ordinary, everyday meaning (Sokolowski 1974, 
255; Sokolowski 2008, 33, 304, 312). A related strategy can be found in Crowell, who thinks 
that phenomenological terms are not analogous to ordinary ones but are instead bound up with 
them due to the way contexts shift meaning. The reduction is not a rupture but a change of focus 
that presents for consideration that which was already there in experience. He thinks the 
transition from ontic to transcendental discourse happens thanks to “metonymy.” Here a word is 
substituted for something it is associated with. “In this account, terms like ‘experience’ or ‘life’ 
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make sense in a transcendental context because the natural attitude is already pervaded by the 
transcendental—not as something radically other, a gnostic spark hidden within it, but as 
something customarily overlooked, anonymous” (Crowell 2001, 262).  
 According to the Sokolowksi–Crowell thesis, then, everyday life is not tidily restricted to 
mundane talk about things: instead, the transcendental is a possibility of the vernacular. There 
remains in our mother tongue terms such as “truth,” “life,” “presence,” and “experience” that do 
not express things but instead our having a world. In this way, an ordinary speaker of English, 
who bemoans the absence of a friend or who invokes the word “truth” in a thoughtful way, is on 
the verge of the phenomenological enterprise. These terms mean more than our ordinary 
grammar can express. They implicate us in a phenomenological grammar than requires an 
explicit appropriation to be understood as such. These are ordinary terms with transcendental 
meanings. 
Given the Sokolowksi–Crowell thesis, what should we make of their particular proposals 
that the phenomenological logos is helped by metonym—the transposition of meaning via 
contiguity—or metaphor—the transposition of meaning via similarity? The problem is that both 
metaphor and metonym appear to be based on relations among things; they thus appear ill-suited 
for expressing the essential shift to the experience of things.
3
 Only if we understand metaphor 
and metonym according to the new grammar of experience instead of the old grammar of things 
will metaphor and metonym be able to function in a phenomenological context. In the new 
grammar, contiguity and similarity can indeed take us beyond things: we can speak, for example, 
metaphorically about the domain of experience as a “clearing” or metonymically (and 
metaphorically) about a thing’s “adumbrations.” Sokolowski, for his part, recognizes that 
metaphor works only against the backdrop of literal meaning (1974, 255). Hence the crucial 
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question, which must be addressed, concerns how the new grammar can be established, that is, 
how the ordinary, anonymous scraps of transcendentalese might be appropriated in the first place 
so that the domain might open and specific terms be introduced via metaphor and metonym. I 
therefore want to follow the Sokolowski–Crowell thesis that terms such as experience, life, truth, 
and presence, while found in ordinary speech, carry a transcendental meaning, but I want to 
explain how these transcendental meanings become activated.  
 
4. THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM: INFLECTION 
Carnap’s misunderstanding of phenomenology reminds us of the need to mind the difference 
between ontic speech about things and transcendental speech about their presence; Derrida’s 
critique of phenomenology reminds us of the need to see this difference as a distinction, not a 
separation. Indication on its own cannot explain the redirection needed to move from ordinary 
speech about things to phenomenological speech about the structure of experience. Analogy, 
metaphor, and metonym, as prima facie relations among things, cannot save indication from 
indeterminacy when it concerns the turn to experience. To meet the challenge, phenomenology 
must give an account of how its speech expresses a distinction in experience, a distinction that 
can be expressed in words and understood by others. The Sokolowski–Crowell thesis rightly 
advances the view that transcendental terms naturally occur in the vernacular but in an 
incoherent manner. The question then becomes how these ordinary terms can be appropriated 
phenomenologically.   
In my view, phenomenology begins by a process I call “inflection”—language speakers 
alter the syntax but not the semantics of certain critical everyday experiential terms and thereby 
allow these terms to emerge in their interconnection with one another as the first expression of 
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the phenomenological domain. The manner in which a neophyte acquires phenomenological 
speech repeats the manner in which an infant acquires ordinary speech. Infants break into speech 
by first selecting out and inflecting animate movement—movement which enables sharing joint 
experience—from other sorts of movement; philosophers break into phenomenological speech 
by selecting out and inflecting experiential terms from other sorts of speech. The acquisition of 
phenomenology therefore comes as the specific appropriation of what makes the acquisition of 
ordinary speech possible. Phenomenology brings joint experience to expression. 
 
4.1 Inflected Animate Action and Ostension 
How do infants acquire their mother tongue? How do they come to learn the conventional words 
spoken around them so that they can become fellow speakers of that speech? Once words are 
learned they can bring about joint presence, but how can prelinguistic joint presence be achieved 
so that an infant’s first words may be learned?  
 Before inquiring into the how of prelinguistic joint presence we would do well to clarify 
just what it is. I offer it as a phenomenological appropriation of the terminology of “joint 
attention” employed by psychologists to explain the means of first word learning; the term 
“attention” is mental and thus internal and individual: What can join prelinguistic attention? The 
concept goes along with appeals to inferential “mind-reading” skills. Following Merleau-Ponty I 
think it is rather external and intersubjective presence, established relative to the exploratory 
movements of our animate bodies, that makes first word learning possible (Engelland 2014). 
Joint presence suggests the way that presence happens for each of us together thanks to our 
bodies; our joints join together our experiential explorations of a world of things. Hence, I think 
the term “joint presence” more adequately expresses the phenomenon that enables infants to 
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learn their first words: it is not thanks to mind-reading attentions but understanding embodied 
presences. 
How can prelinguistic presence occur, and how can prelinguistic presence give way to 
linguistic transcendence of immediate presence? Here our phenomenological project concerning 
word learning will be helped by availing ourselves of the phenomenological insights of 
Wittgenstein and Augustine (Engelland 2014, Engelland 2018). Though Wittgenstein (1958) 
criticizes Augustine (1991) as an account of the nature of language, he does not do so as an 
account of how infants break into speech; Wittgenstein acknowledges that the way they do so 
will depend on (1) ostension in the context of routine behavior and (2) a language more primitive 
than our own.  
 
1. Ostension 
Wittgenstein follows Augustine in thinking that there must be a prelinguistic “common human 
way of acting [Handlungsweise]” (Wittgenstein 1958, 82, trans. mod.). Merleau-Ponty (1973, 
2012) likewise emphasizes the way our flesh advertises our affective lives to each other. Hence, 
the child can look to the language speaker and see what that speaker is attending to. The first 
words a child learns comes by way of the child tuning in to the prelinguistic meaning of bodily 
exploration. This tuning in consists in the natural ability to select out from movement in general 
movements manifesting experiential engagement: the movement toward and away from things, 
the tone of excitement or the tone of disappointment, the gesture of pointing or the face that 
either grimaces or melts with recognition. Other movements, such as sitting or standing, 
respiring or coughing, scratching and rubbing, are not directly relevant for making sense of the 
intentional, experiential lives of language users. Hence in order for bodily movement to serve as 
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the prelinguistic basis for joint presence, it is necessary to thematize a particular aspect of 
movement, movement as manifesting experiential engagement. To learn their first words 
children must first clue in to this aspect of bodily movement, the way it discloses our 
engagement with the things we might talk about. It should be emphasized that this class of 
movement need not be deployed with the intention to communicate—just insofar as I 
experientially explore the world, I must move and in doing so others can see this whether or not I 
am trying to get them to do so.  
Beginning around nine months of age, expressive movement is, as it were, emphasized or 
inflected, and that is what establishes prelinguistic joint presence, affording the child the 
possibility of breaking into speech (Engelland 2014, Tomasello 1999). The advent of ordinary 
speech, then, involves highlighting movement expressing experiential engagement from the full 
range of bodily movements. This expressive movement enables ostensions: unknown words can 
thereby be converted to identifications via attending to joint presence. The child hears a word, 
looks to see the highlighted item of interest, and registers that word’s meaning. 
 Of course any appeal to ostension is hounded by the notorious ambiguity of pointing 
gestures. Wittgenstein thinks the language teacher solves the gavagai-problem for the auditor by 
correcting mistakes; Quine thinks that the linguist solves the gavagai-problem by projecting his 
own understanding on what is objectively indeterminate: “The implicit maxim guiding his choice 
of ‘rabbit,’ and similar choices for other native words, is that an enduring and relatively 
homogeneous object, moving as a whole against a contrasting background, is a likely reference 
for a short expression” (Quine 1969, 34). In Ostension, I argue that a child handles radical 
indeterminacy, because there is more to experience than Wittgenstein and Quine fathom 
(Engelland 2014). In particular, the transcendental structure of human experience naturally 
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profiles movement over rest and difference over sameness. A gesture accordingly attracts our 
attention but routine sitting still does not. There are certain natural constraints such as a bias 
toward the novel, toward certain-sized objects, toward a certain kind of thing, toward essential 
rather than accidental properties, and toward a certain level of generalization. The child’s natural 
wants, the context of everyday routines and games, and repetition across various contexts helps 
constrain the logically endless possibilities of ostension, thereby enabling children to learn the 
meaning of their words. The logic of experience makes prelinguistic joint presence possible and 
its natural ambiguity manageable.  
 
2. From Protolanguage to Language 
Insofar as language is a system of signs and any given move in a language game makes sense 
only relative to a whole complex of others, it seems silly to say that there can be such a thing as a 
first word: “What sort of folly is it to say that a child speaks a ‘first’ word” (Gadamer 1976, 63). 
And yet every parent recalls the first words of a child: “mom,” “dad,” “ball,” “dog.” These words 
are blunt instruments at first, lacking the art of careful contextual embedding that will come later 
with syntax, but there remains a continuity between “Mom!” said as a first word and “Mom, may 
I borrow the car, please?” said years later. Wittgenstein rightly points out that learning language 
as a system of signs requires an intermediary mode of speaking that introduces the first 
assortment of terms: “A child uses such primitive forms of language when it learns to talk” 
(Wittgenstein 1958, 4). Before one learns to play chess, one has to be able to distinguish the 
pieces from one another; before speaking full-blown speech, children must get a handle on some 
characteristic pieces, although this first grasp cannot be equated with mature language: “Naming 
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is so far not a move in the language-game—any more than putting a piece in its place on the 
board is a move in chess” (Wittgenstein 1958, 24).  
This first language, protolanguage, is semantics bereft of syntax, and it is typical of four 
language groups: children from about one to two years of age, trained chimps, feral children, and 
speakers of pidgin (that is, speakers of different languages thrown together who improvise a new 
system of communicating). From about ages one to two, children are able to learn words, but 
they do not combine the words syntactically. Instead they string them together serially. But who 
gave what to whom and when remains undetermined, although context proves helpful (Bickerton 
1990, Bickerton 1995, Sokolowski 2008).  
Contra Wittgenstein, but in accord with Augustine, the infant need not be taught this 
primitive language game; rather, the child is able to pick up speech by eavesdropping on 
conversations (Bloom 2000). The novel word-sounds constitute so many indications or 
invitations for the child to look into the field of joint experience and register identities and 
meanings. While eavesdropping, a child must look about for relevant items, ignoring much that 
is said, for the environment does not afford the possibility of learning the meaning of all the 
words spoken; a child cannot learn as its first words terms for things that are not present or on 
the verge of being present. “The milk’s not warm enough,” says the mother as she passes the 
bottle back to the father. The child can pair the word-sound milk and milk in this way. But 
consider an infant overhearing this sentence: “There’s no way the president will win reelection.” 
Here president and reelection cannot be paired with these absent objects. Note the situation is no 
different for the child of the president. The referents for such terms as ‘president’ and 
‘reelection’ cannot be present in the way medium-sized perceptual objects, such as milk, ball, 
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mom, dad, and truck, can be made present. The child can achieve a beachhead in speech only 
regarding things and actions present to perception.  
Beginning about age two, though, infants start to combine words in increasingly 
unambiguous ways thanks to the ordering clarity of syntactical arrangement: protolanguage 
yields to language, which differentiates subjects from objects and makes definitions possible. 
Where does syntax come from? The very part–whole structures at work in the experienced world 
instigate the child, who is primed by nature to register such things, to bring together words as 
parts into sentential wholes (Husserl 1948, Sokolowski 2008, 48–67). The terms are fitted 
together or inflected in order to express the fitted togetherness or flexion of experience.  
Now, once syntax kicks in, the field of joint presence ranges beyond one’s immediate 
reach; heretofore absent or abstract terms can be adopted. Thanks to the part–whole structure of 
syntax, the child can identify missing parts and venture to ask the question, “What is that?” 
While first words must be learned through perceptual presence, second words can be learned 
through definition in the absence of their referents. Thanks to syntax, the child can solicit 
definitions and be able thereby to learn what president and reelection mean, and then the child 
might even bring about a kind of presence to these terms, as she watches the victory speech of 
the president or sees him sign some piece of legislation. Protolanguage brings about presences—
“Milk!” the child cries—or registers presences—“Digger!”—but it cannot articulate the presence 
and absence of things. It targets things in a holistic way from within the ambit of desire or 
interest but without being able to articulate this desire and interest. Syntax not only allows us to 
articulate the structures of things and relations at work in states of affairs; it also centrally 
requires us to tense our actions, and these tenses involve us in a continual navigation of the 
presence and absence of what we’re talking about. It rained yesterday, but it is sunny today. 
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Syntax’s structure enables the speaker of language to do something that the speaker of 
protolanguage cannot: to track the interplay of presence and absence and speak of things to 
others in a variegated manner. In this way, speech catches up to the complex interplay 
constitutive of experience itself. 
 
4.2 The Ordinary Vocabulary Inflected 
We can therefore distinguish first words, requiring joint presence, from second words, which 
arise through definition and syntax relative to these first words. The first words, established by 
joint presence, allow the second words, marked by absence or abstraction, to be acquired. Just as 
ordinary language comes about in two stages, the acquisition of phenomenological speech 
requires two stages. In the first, there are the inconspicuous but transcendental features of 
ordinary language. Only having acquired these terms as such is it possible to enter the second 
stage: making sense of indications that point in the direction of phenomenological experience. 
Phenomenological initiation is a matter of calling attention to these strange everyday words, of 
highlighting them, of explicating and thematizing them. How do the elemental 
phenomenological terms arise so that advanced terms can be indicated? 
For a phenomenological indication to function, the general domain must first be 
expressed, however obscurely, thanks to heretofore unnoticed horizons of ordinary speech. 
Phenomenology converts these terms into phenomenological ones, not by inverting or 
transforming their meaning but by noticing them. The phenomenological act of appropriating an 
ordinary term while preserving the ordinary meaning I call inflection. In doing so, I would 
highlight three of the word’s ordinary senses outlined by the Oxford English Dictionary: (1) 
Regarding movement, inflection names a bending of something in toward oneself. Charles 
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Darwin, for example, writes of the inflection of a plant’s tentacle. (2) Regarding the spoken 
word, it names a modulation of voice. (3) Regarding grammar, it speaks of the way the same 
words can enter into different grammatical relations, including declension, conjugation, and 
comparison, precisely in order to comprise a single linguistic whole; instead of being serially 
arranged, they are interconnected. Phenomenology begins by inflecting or bending toward 
oneself a set of ordinary transcendental terms by stressing them in speech; it thereby alters not 
the meaning but the interconnected grammar of these words; in doing so, it talks not about things 
per se but about our experience of them. In Ideas I, Husserl says that in transcendental reflection 
ordinary terms, such as apple tree, should appear only in quotation marks to mark the difference 
in approach (Husserl 2014, 176); conversely, I think we might consider transcendental terms as 
carrying implicit quotation marks when they occur in ordinary speech. Phenomenology 
actualizes these ordinary terms by dropping the quotation marks and speaking about them 
straightforwardly. 
Let’s take the phenomenological claim that experience is the interplay of presence and 
absence or that perception is a matter of making something present.
4
 In ordinary speech, we talk 
about the presence or absence of something or someone—a lifeguard, for example—but not 
presence and absence as such: “Samantha, the sign says no swimming when the lifeguard is not 
present.” Or, when we say, “Absence makes the heart grow fonder,” we have in mind not 
absence per se but the absence of a loved one. To inflect presence and absence means to shift 
from something or someone to presence and absence as such. The implicit interplay becomes 
explicit. In doing so the experiential agency relative to which presence and absence occur 
becomes heighted. Having become inflected, presence and absence becomes the syntax for a 
thoroughgoing exploration of all the structures of experience. We can now speak, for example, of 
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the interplay of presence and absence even regarding a present object of perception, arrayed 
necessarily in such a way that some sides are absent while others are present. Hence, inflection 
retains the meaning of these ordinary experiential terms but places them in a new context 
determined by the experiential engagement with things. 
The working out of phenomenology is the development of this new syntax of experience. 
Presence and absence are rooted in our bodily being which situates us in a particular locale, a 
“here” relative to other “theres.” It is the interchange of these locative terms—the fact that my 
here is your there and your here is my there—that lies at the basis of Husserl’s account of 
transcendental intersubjectivity in the fifth of the Cartesian Meditations (Husserl 1977). Such 
thoughts occur to us slowly but they are experienced quite early. The infant lives in the interplay 
of the presence and absence of what it needs and wants; the joy of crawling and then walking 
concerns in part the ability to take the play of presence and absence into one’s own hands. The 
child’s game of peekaboo takes its joy from interpersonal absence-canceling-presence.  
The poet’s pen too touches on this theme. The presence and the absence of the beloved 
affects our experience of the whole field of experience. In Sonnet 15, Shakespeare writes, “When 
I consider every thing that grows / Holds in perfection but a little moment, / That this huge stage 
presenteth nought but shows / Whereon the stars in secret influence comment.” In this case, the 
field of presence makes changing things manifest in their manifestation. This field of presence in 
turn affects the experience of others. In Sonnet 97, he likewise writes, “How like a winter hath 
my absence been / From thee, the pleasure of the fleeting year! / What freezings have I felt, what 
dark days seen! / What old December’s bareness every where!” Here the absence of the 
beloved’s field of presence makes the world of nature mean nothing: its springtime therefore 
becomes as winter without the transfiguring presence of the beloved’s field of experience. 
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Shakespeare’s speech demonstrates that the interplay of the beloved’s presence and absence 
interests us in the interplay of presence and absence. Inflection takes such interest and makes it 
thematic. 
Presence entails the presence in the flesh of something or someone to someone against 
the backdrop of possible absence. Experience takes place thanks to the interplay of the presence 
and absence of things to us. Now things are the things they are, independently of whether they 
are present or absent; presence and absence, moreover, remain what they are, independently of 
what happens to be present or absent. Things transcend experience, and experience transcends 
things. Nevertheless, it is due to experience that we can experience things as transcending that 
selfsame experience. In the field of presence, things can come to presence or return to absence 
while remaining the things they are. Phenomenology arises as the possibility of thinking about 
and experiencing presence and absence as such.  
The inflection that stands at the basis of phenomenological speech resembles the 
inflection at the basis of ordinary speech. For it is only by inflecting specifically purposive 
bodily movement from the general class of bodily movements that one establishes the 
prelinguistic joint presence necessary for acquiring an initial vocabulary, and it is only by 
inflecting such terms as presence and absence that one establishes the domain necessary for 
instituting an initial phenomenological vocabulary.  
 
Table 15.1 Two Features of Inflection 
 Uninflected Inflected 
Mereology 
Disparate pieces: 
presence, absence 
Interconnected moments:  
presence and absence 
Shift Something present Presence of something to us 
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4.3 The Technical Vocabulary Indicated, Exemplified, and Expressed 
Inflection communicates the opening of the domain: terms such as presence and absence become 
changed in their syntax but not their semantics. No longer are they attributes of things; thanks to 
inflection they become distinguished from the things that are present and absent. Once inflection 
expresses the opened phenomenological domain, it becomes possible to introduce 
phenomenology’s suite of technical terms. Ordinary speech is not adequate for all aspects of the 
domain of experience. There are equivocations to be worked out, and words such as “noesis” 
must be coined to name new aspects of the domain (Husserl 2014, 167). Such technical terms 
can be introduced through directional negation. That is, introducing the phenomenological term 
involves identifying a term from ordinary discourse or creating a new one while establishing the 
term’s present incomprehensibility. “On pain of absurdity, phenomenon1 is not x, y, or z.” Well, 
what is it? The negations do not merely eliminate candidates. They also move in a particular 
direction; that is, they convert an ambiguous or unknown term into an indication. Recall Wundt’s 
observations, mentioned above, concerning the roundabout way Husserl’s breakthrough work, 
Logical Investigations, introduces its novel vocabulary, including truth and knowledge, but also 
meaning-intention, meaning-fulfillment, confirmation, and categorial perception. Husserl takes a 
term and makes it questionable in such a way that a peculiar direction is established toward its 
fulfillment. Or Heidegger introduces a term such as “being-in-the-world” by telling us he does 
not mean by “in” the sense in which some object is inside another, he does not mean by “being” 
the sense in which something is an object or a tool, and he does not mean by “world” a spatial 
container. The exasperated reader runs out of options for understanding and feels keenly the 
question, “Well, what then!?” One is eavesdropping here in the specific sense that one is not yet 
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able to understand this speech let alone produce it. It may indeed be addressed to the interlocutor 
as a reader or as a student, but insofar as it cannot yet be understood as addressed, it remains a 
message intercepted rather than one that is properly one’s own. 
Phenomenology is a science built not on indications but on expressions, although these 
expressions must necessarily first be understood as indications before they can be confirmed and 
understood as such. It is here that the philosophical example becomes crucial, for the described 
example provides the occasion for the reader to fix the meaning of the phenomenological terms. 
Phenomenology, Husserl says,  
has to place before its eyes pure occurrences of consciousness as exemplars; it has to 
bring them to ever more perfect clarity; within this clarity it has to analyze them and 
apprehend their essences, it has to pursue the patently discernible connections among the 
essences and take up what is respectively seen into faithful conceptual expressions that 
allows them to dictate their sense purely through what is seen or generally discerned, and 
so forth. (Husserl 2014, 119)  
 
For example, in the Logical Investigations Husserl points out that one and the same perceived 
event, such as the blackbird’s flying away, can be expressed through a variety of sentences. In 
doing so, he provides a window for the reader onto his distinction between meaning-intention 
and meaning-fulfillment. Similarly, Heidegger’s classic example of the hammer that becomes an 
object of thematic regard when it is broken or missing provides a window for the reader onto the 
inconspicuousness of everyday presence and the way in which such presences are related to 
human projects and the transcendental structure of world. The importance of examples in this 
respect approaches that of the role ascribed to them by Kuhn (1977) for scientific revolutions. It 
is not by mastering rules that a scientific shift occurs; it is by thinking through a new 
paradigmatic example that one starts to think of the whole in a new way. One glimpses Plato’s 
doctrine of forms by following a discussion of piety or justice, and one makes sense of 
Descartes’s res extensa by thinking through the wax example in the second of the Meditations on 
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First Philosophy. So it is with phenomenology: the phenomenological indications are converted 
into phenomenological expressions by means of thinking through the articulation of examples. 
Husserl underscores the importance of exemplars, delineated by imagination, for fulfilling the 
meaning of scientific terms (Husserl 1980, 86). By considering the ostended examples, we can 
convert the indication into an expression, the pointer into a term.  
 Heidegger’s infamous inaugural lecture, “What Is Metaphysics?” serves to accomplish 
the initiation into phenomenological experience and speech. He takes an ordinary word, 
“nothing,” and introduces it through strategic negations: though it is presupposed by access to 
things, it is not any thing. Perhaps he thinks he is inflecting a term, but in fact he presses the 
word into a new meaning, one that it does not enjoy in the vernacular. He has thereby sought to 
convert an ordinary word into an indication by highlighting its halo of confusion. And he further 
wants to convert the indication to an expression by getting us to see it as the correlate of angst. 
The real obstacle to understanding this text is its failure to inflect ordinary words and instead to 
lead with an indication. Carnap demonstrates the perils of the procedure. He eavesdrops, but 
being disoriented by Heidegger’s failure to inflect the natural transcendental language of 
experience, does not mind the negations and so cannot grasp the indication as indication. Carnap 
reads the indication within the horizon of ordinary speech about things. He does not fathom the 
fact that phenomenology instead expresses the presence of things. To ward off such 
misunderstandings, phenomenology does well to begin with inflection rather than indication, and 
then to indicate only while being continually perspicacious and forthright about the character—
and limits—of such indication (Engelland 2020b). Phenomenology, it is true, will not travel far 
without indication, but it will not get started without inflection. 
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Table 15.2 Stages of Phenomenological Initiation 
 Auditor Speaker 
Neophyte Eavesdropping on nonsense 
Inflection of vernacular’s 
transcendental terms 
Amateur 
Inflection of vernacular’s 
transcendental terms 
Dialectical differentiations 
establishing indications 
Proficient Established indications 
Indications elucidated via 
examples 
Expert 
Indications converted to 
expressions via elucidation 
Phenomenological 
conversation 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Phenomenological speech is not disconnected from ordinary language. It arises as a distinct 
possibility within ordinary speech, a possibility that when enacted unfolds as a new manner of 
speaking, based in part on inflecting the old and acquiring novel terms through exemplification. 
We learn to speak our mother tongue thanks to joint presence; and we learn to speak our 
phenomenological tongue by speaking directly about what is ordinarily inconspicuous: the 
interplay of presence and absence thanks to which things and others are experienced as 
intelligible and sayable. 
Just as animate movement harbors the possibility of joint presence and thus semantics, 
which subverts itself by opening the possibility of language and joint absence, so language itself 
harbors the possibility of making presence and absence itself into an explicit theme. Like the 
child’s breakthrough into speech, the breakthrough into phenomenology presupposes prior 
powers while transcending them. It is not the case that ordinary language must become what it is 
not. It is rather the case that the vernacular, harboring within it not only the power to speak about 
things but also about their presence, naturally affords possibilities that phenomenology explicitly 
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enacts and on the basis of which its novel terms can be pointed out. The inflection of the 
vernacular’s transcendental terms achieves linguistic articulation of the logic of experience, and 
it was just this logic of experience that enabled the joint presence necessary for acquiring our 
mother tongue. In this way, phenomenological speech is nothing other than the expression of 
ordinary speech’s own origins in joint experience. Inflected terms in turn make understandable 
the introduction of indications, which are often made less indeterminate by means of analogies, 
metaphors, and metonyms. Such indications are converted to expressions through following 
dialectical differentiation and the elucidation of examples. 
 Gary Gutting (2012) observed, “The continental-analytic gap will begin to be bridged 
only when seminal thinkers of the Continent begin to write more clearly.” They will begin to 
write more clearly, I submit, only when they explicitly recognize the origin of the 
phenomenological logos in the inflection of certain terms already operative in everyday 
language. For, as the poets bear witness and everyday life attests, there is more to our mother 
tongue than just more and more talk about the properties of things. Readers of phenomenological 
texts should be put on notice that phenomenologists will have them speaking in ways that are 
both familiar and strange. 
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